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Pattern, Puzzle, Peculiarity: Rhodesia’s UDI and Decolonisation in Southern 
Africa.  
 
On 18th April 1980, the Union Jack was finally lowered at Government House, 
Harare. Presiding over this muted piece of imperial theatre, Lord Soames, who had 
been appointed interim governor of Rhodesia at the end of 1979, was flanked by 
Prince Charles, with both men mustering the appropriate level of solemnity that 
befitted the occasion.i Ninety years after the pioneer column had raised the Union 
Flag, its lowering in April 1980 symbolised the formal end of British control in the 
country, the birth of Zimbabwe, and had so 
lved one of the most intractable episodes in the history of Britain’s decolonisation.  
 
Some twenty years earlier, the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, had spoken 
of the ‘Wind of Change’ blowing through the African continent. ‘Whether we like it 
or not’,  he opinedopined the Edwardian poseur, ‘this growth of national 
consciousness is a political fact’. ii Despite this, however, one place that the wind 
seemingly skirted was central and Southern Africa. Just as Macmillan’s speech 
received its second airing in Cape Town in February 1960, Walter Monckton 
commenced his tour of the Central African Federation being ostensibly charged by 
the British government to assess its health. Seven years after Federation had been 
inaugurated, it was becoming increasingly clear that the impulses that first simulated 
the territorial amalgamation between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland were diminishing. Created as a ‘counterpoise to Afrikaner nationalism’ 
and promoted as a way to satisfy both white and black nationalism, Federation was 
theoretically supposed to bring ‘partnership’ between black and white within the three 
territories.iii Yet, ‘partnership’ was ‘purposefully vague, with its opacity lending itself 
to a variety of meanings’.iv As leading African nationalist, Joshua Nkomo, recalled in 
his memoirs, ‘Huggins . . . explained what Federation was really about. He stated that 
his aim was to create in Central Africa a new partnership like that of the rider and the 
horse. That was very honest. The white man was to ride, the black man was to carry 
him’. v  Finally published in October 1960, the Monckton Commission’s report 
concluded that the only way to maintain Federation was through force. As Philip 
Murphy has demonstrated, while the British government were not prepared to commit 
themselves militarily to quell the rising tide of African nationalism, they were also not 
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devoted to perpetual white rule.vi Consequently plans were set in motion to dissolve 
Federation, with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland receiving their independence as 
Zambia and Malawi in 1964. As one contemporary newspaper columnist put it: ‘the 
Federation, conceived in sin and nurtured in neglect, now, unwanted, dies in 
apathy’.vii  
 
The precise fate of Southern Rhodesia remained unclear. The size of the white settler 
population (hardly more than 250,000) belied the power they wielded in the region, 
and indeed the emotional hold they occupied in the British public imagination.viii 
There still remains controversy regarding whether or not British foreign secretary Rab 
Butler promised the Rhodesian delegation independence under minority governance 
at the Victoria Falls conference of 1963.ix When Butler returned to parliament after 
the conclusion of the conference, John Strachey, MP for Dundee West, acerbically 
reminded him that ‘his success at the Victoria Falls conference was on the easier part 
of the problem and that the more difficult part, the future of Southern Rhodesia, still 
lies ahead of him.’x  
 
Events in Southern Rhodesia, particularly the results of the 1962 general election, also 
dramatically altered the course taken in the region, as the newly formed Rhodesian 
Front (RF) swept to power, led by tobacco farmer Winston Field. A definitive shift to 
the right, the ascension of the RF and the hardening of racial attitudes within the 
country put the white settlers on the ‘course to collision’, as the prospect of an illegal 
declaration of independence (UDI) from the Crown looked increasingly probable.xi 
From 1964 onwards, Ian Smith, who replaced Field as party leader, chartered this 
path. The first prime minister born in the country, Smith was a decorated war hero, 
and had been involved in Rhodesian politics since the late 1940s. Continually 
underestimated in Whitehall as ‘a simple minded, politically naïve, and 
uncompromising character’, xii  the issue of Rhodesian independence was one that 
dogged the foreign policy agenda of successive British governments, triggering ‘the 
most protracted crisis of British decolonisation’.xiii  
 
Twelve days after narrowly winning the 1964 British general election on 27th 
October, the new Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson turned his attention to 
Rhodesia, warning Smith’s government that if it declared illegal independence from 
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the Crown there would be grave diplomatic and economic consequences. While this 
gave the RF reason to pause, a succession of abortive meetings between Wilson and 
Smith, Rhodesia’s exclusion from Commonwealth meetings, and the results of the 
1965 election emboldened Smith’s government to declare independence from the 
British government on 11th November 1965.xiv  
 
Addressing the country via a radio broadcast on the 11th November, Smith’s high 
flown oratory declared:  
  
 We may be a small country, but we are a determined people who have been 
 called upon to play a role of world-wide significance. We Rhodesians have 
 rejected the doctrinaire philosophy of appeasement and surrender. The 
 decision which we have taken today is a refusal by Rhodesians to sell their 
 birth right … We have struck a blow for the preservation of justice, 
 civilization, and Christianity.xv 
 
The reaction of the British government was swift. Wilson immediately condemned 
Rhodesia’s actions, and imposed economic sanctions in the hope that this would bring 
the rogue settlers back to terms.xvi While all sides of the House of Commons lamented 
Rhodesia’s declaration of UDI, they did so for quite different reasons. Robert Turton, 
Conservative MP for Thirsk and Malton, proffered that ‘in no country in the world is 
there more loyalty to Her Majesty the Queen’, while Sydney Silverman, Labour MP 
for Nelson and Colne, pursued a different tack, asking Wilson directly: ‘What would 
the right Hon. Gentleman's advice be to the 4 million Africans who presumably 
remain loyal and who are now in a state of emergency, who are refused the right to 
express an opinion, who are refused access to information’.xvii Tempting as it may be 
to cleave to the dichotomy that suggests that the Conservatives largely represented the 
interests of white settlers, while Labour MP’s favoured those of the African majority, 
one thing is clear: Wilson thought that UDI would be over in ‘a matter of weeks 
rather than months’.xviii While historiographical speculation continues over Wilson’s 
handling of the entire affair, it is difficult not to agree, at least in part, with Carl 
Watts’ assessment that Wilson’s handling of Rhodesia’s UDI ‘demonstrated a 
profound error of judgement’.xix Although Wilson persuaded himself that UDI would 
be over quickly, a ‘rebellious white population the size of Portsmouth’ went on to 
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defy international condemnation, the waging of increasingly effective guerrilla 
warfare and the imposition of international sanctions for fourteen years.xx  
 
The impact of Rhodesia’s decision to declare UDI was felt far beyond the country’s 
national borders. In Southern Africa, Smith’s regime enjoyed support from the 
apartheid state and Portuguese East Africa. This buttressing, however, did not last 
forever. When Mozambique gained its independence in 1975, Rhodesia lost the 
practical and psychological support afforded by the previous regime, whilst also 
becoming increasingly vulnerable to guerrilla incursion on three ‘fronts’. In addition, 
although Pretoria continued to exert its power in the region (often to the benefit of the 
Smith regime), South African Prime Minister B.J. Vorster’s policy of détente further 
weakened Smith’s position.xxi It was during the second half of the 1970s, therefore, 
within a context dramatically altered by the conflict in Angola, that regional and 
international diplomacy increased its efforts to find a political solution that would 
bring about a ceasefire and usher in majority rule governance.  
 
It is now almost axiomatic to argue that Rhodesia proved to be one of the most 
complex episodes in the history of Britain’s decolonisation since the Suez Crisis of 
1956. The Rhodesian ‘problem’ however remained a thorn in the side of successive 
British governments. As Labour MP for Watford Raphael Tuck asked Ted Heath in 
1973: ‘why is the Prime Minister's approach to this problem so weak-kneed?’ He 
went on further: ‘does he think that his predecessor, Mr. Disraeli, would have been 
guilty of such spineless inactivity? Why does not the right Hon. Gentleman call a 
meeting of the Governments concerned and make clear to them this country's 
determined disapproval.’xxii From Wilson in 1964 through to James Callaghan over a 
decade later, successive Labour governments, despite high-flown rhetoric to the 
contrary, did not ensure the coming of majority rule in the country. Only in the early 
days of the premiership of Margaret Thatcher was the puzzle of Rhodesia finally 
solved. As the 1970s progressed, white Rhodesia found itself with fewer international 
friends, alongside being embroiled in a deeply damaging and seemingly unwinnable 
civil war. The personification of belligerent and outmoded settler colonialism, by the 
late 1970s, Smith’s misguided boast that he didn’t ‘believe in majority rule ever in 
Rhodesia—not in 1,000 years’xxiii rang hollow, as he committed the country to the 
Lancaster House negotiations, where the details of Zimbabwe’s independence were 
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finally thrashed out. Barely one month after Zimbabwe was born, Lord Soames, the 
last British governor of the country, remarked in a public lecture that: ‘from the 
beginning, Britain’s commitment in Rhodesia was hesitant and reluctant – the reverse 
of full hearted’.xxiv  
 
On 11 November 2015, fifty years since UDI had been declared, approximately thirty 
scholars from within and outside the Southern African region came together to further 
debate the legacy of Rhodesia’s UDI. Held, at the University of the Free State in 
Bloemfontein, South Africa, in what once was the heartland of the Afrikaner National 
Party, the conference ‘From the Second to the Third Chimurenga: Historical 
Perspectives on Zimbabwe’s Recent Past’, brought together both eminent and 
emerging scholars who grappled with, and debated the impact that UDI and 
Zimbabwe’s eventual decolonisation had on the region’s history. 
 
Held over two days, Iit became clear that many papers presented at the conference 
were based on a highly sophisticated and fresh reading of multiple source bases, and 
were thus opening up new and important avenues of historical research into the 
dynamics of Zimbabwe’s decolonisation. In particular, it became obvious that various 
papers on the role of finance and ‘big business’, and the regional and international 
actors involved in the country’s negotiated independence, were updating long held 
historiographical wisdoms, and signalling a revival in economic and diplomatic 
explanations for the country’s decolonisation. Furthermore, the articles in this special 
edition shed new light on the roles(s) played in the decolonisation of Zimbabwe by 
economic (private business) and political (liberation movements, Western and 
Southern African governments) actors that until now have been studied with very 
limited access to primary sources.  
 
The first article by Tony Hopkins, the keynote speaker at the conference: 
‘Globalisation and Decolonisation’, serves as a plenary, thereby opening up new ways 
to think about decolonisation. In particular, Hopkins’ wide-ranging article (re) 
examines debates concerning the divisions between formal and informal empires, and 
the position of the United States as an imperial power. Articles from Tinashe 
Nyamunda, Andrew Cohen and Rory Pilossof examine economics, and the role of 
multinational companies in the narratives of Zimbabwe’s period of protracted 
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decolonisation. Contrary to arguments that suggest Smith and his RF cabinet rashly 
declared UDI in November 1965, Nyamunda’s provocatively argued piece suggests 
that UDI was a calculated financial risk, with the white settlers correctly assuming 
that the British government would not use force to bring their ‘kith and kin’ to terms. 
Cohen and Pilossof’s expansive article details Concentrating on the relationship 
between the managing-director of Lonrho, the (un) gentlemanly capitalist Roland 
‘Tiny’ Rowland, and the editor of the magazine Property & Finance, Wilfred 
Brookes. Examining, Cohen and Pilossof’s article examines white settler mistrust of 
foreign capital, their article provides . In doing so it provides a major reassessment of 
the supposed homogeneity of white Rhodesian society, as well as shedding 
furthersheds new  light on the role of multinational companies in the processes of 
African decolonisation.  
 
The article from Arrigo Pallotti examines the forces of African anti-colonial 
nationalism and the respective roles played by prominent individuals, such as 
Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere. As Pallotti’s finely observed article details, 
Nyerere as supporter of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, was identified (from the 
Anglo-American perspective) as a potential bridgehead who could be utilised to enact 
their wishes. Yet as is demonstrated, Nyerere was neither a blind apparatchik nor a 
stooge of the West., as Hhe constantly strove to navigate the politics of the middle in 
order to reach a settlement that was acceptable to the ever-expanding range of actors 
involved in bringing Rhodesia to terms.  
 
Staying with diplomatic histories, articles from Timothy Scarnecchia and Sue Onslow 
further examine the dynamics of the negotiations over Rhodesia’s decolonisation after 
the Geneva Conference and until the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement in 
December 1979. In particular, Scarnecchia’s acute analysis highlights the tensions, 
rivalries and air of mistrust that dominated the negotiations over Rhodesia in the 
period 1977-1978, and indeed the enmity between Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe 
as leaders of the Patriotic Front. Moving on to analyse the Lancaster House talks, at 
which Zimbabwe’s independence was finally negotiated, Onslow’s lucidly argued 
article examines the contentious issue of land resettlement. In particular, Onslow 
reviews the actions of the British government in the late 1970s in order to understand 
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if a parsimonious Treasury circumscribed British actions with regards to the transfer 
of power.the implementation of meaningful land restitution.  
 
As scholarship on Zimbabwe is currently dominated by studies that seek to 
understand the ‘crisis’ in which the country has recently found itself, it is our hope 
that the articles within this collection will create further profitable dialogue between 
historians of the region and decolonisation as a whole. In doing so we hope that the 
writings hereincontributions to this issue will go some way towards providing a more 
nuanced understanding of the continuities and discontinuities between Zimbabwe’s 
colonial and postcolonial history, as well as examining the roles played by external 
governments and individuals in the decolonisation of Zimbabwe.  
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